
	THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	
25X1	WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505	
National Intelligence	Officers	25
	27 June 1977	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Representatives of the SALT Monitoring Working Group	
SUBJECT:	Draft Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: MONITORING A SALT TWO AGREEMENT	
Memorandum on "M	ed is the latest draft of the Interagency Intelligence Monitoring a SALT TWO Agreement." The main text and annexes ed in accordance with the review conducted at recent working	
<u> </u>		]
6 July 1977 at C provide the name	clean-up session on this draft will be held on Wednesday, CIA Headquarters Building in Room 3-E-62 at 0930. Please of your representative to by noon Tuesday, 5 July.	
6 July 1977 at C provide the name	A Headquarters Building in Room 3-E-62 at 0930. Please of your representative to by noon Tuesday, 5 July.  Howard Stoertz, Jr.	
6 July 1977 at C provide the name	CIA Headquarters Building in Room 3-E-62 at 0930. Please of your representative to by noon Tuesday, 5 July.	
6 July 1977 at C provide the name b	Howard Stoertz, Jr.  National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs	
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Monitoring a SALT TWO agreement will be more difficult than monitoring the Interim Agreement. While the Interim Agreement essentially froze the numbers of both fixed land-based ICBM and SLBM launchers, the new agreement will establish an aggregate limitation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. This aggregate will limit more systems and will contain more options for exchanging one type of weapon system for another than did the provisions of the Interim Agreement. The new agreement will also limit each side's launchers for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs, a provision which will require not only the counting of missile launchers but also the determination of the type of missile they contain. Finally, the agreement will contain limitations on ICBM launch-weight and throw-weight and, possibly, other constraints on the qualitative capabilities of strategic systems as well as bans on certain types of systems. As we move from the Interim Agreement limits on numbers of large, readily identifiable items (like fixed land-based ICBM and SLBM launchers) to limits on more difficult systems (like aerodynamic vehicles) and qualitative limitations (such as missile throw-weight), there are bound to be greater uncertainties in monitoring Soviet compliance.

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